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CHAPTER 7 
Ethics in Dangerous Situations 
C. Anthony Pfaff, Ted Reich, Walter Redman, and Michael Hurley 
To protect soldiers repairing a vehicle on a road, a platoon leader in Iraq 
provided protection for them by positioning two manned vehicles along 
possible routes that other vehicles, potentially laden with explosives, could 
use. In doing so, he decided not to follow the platoon's standard operat-
ing procedure (SOP), which called for controlling traffic along the road by 
separating nonthreatening Iraqi vehicles from suspicious ones. He believed 
that he was being"paid to exercise judgment," so he broke from routine. 
Because he knew the enemy had used snipers against soldiers on this 
road in the past, he calculated that the risk of them doing so again far out-
weighed the potential of firing on nonthreatening Iraqi vehicles because of 
a failure to control the traffic.! 
Soon after getting their vehicles in position, the soldiers saw a sedan 
speeding toward their position. As it got closer, the platoon leader ordered 
one of his soldiers to fire a warning shot, after which the sedan sped up. 
Thinking they were in imminent danger, the soldiers trained their fire on 
the sedan and braced for an explosion. The sedan skidded to a stop less 
than five meters from the soldiers, and they soon discovered that they 
had killed an elderly man with thick glasses and hearing aids in both ears. 
When the battalion executive officer reviewed the platoon's actions, he 
agreed with the lieutenant's decision to deviate from routine and not put 
soldiers on the road, affirmed that the soldiers "did the right thing," and 
called the killing of the elderly man a "terrible tragedy of war."2 
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ACCOMPLISHING MISSIONS WHILE MINIMIZING HARM For the most part, the reason soldiers, police, and other crisis respond-ers operate in dangerous situations is to make those situations safer 
or to neutralize the danger altogether. Soldiers fight enemies, police 
combat crime, and emergency workers rescue the distressed. DOing 
so ethically requires them to balance the competing demands of accomplish-
ing their mission, preserving lives, and minimizing harm to others and pre-
serving personal safety. These competing needs can be categorized by levels 
of risk: risk to mission, risk to others, and risk to self. Most societies create 
and empower certain professional organizations-in particular, the military, 
law enforcement, and emergency response outfits-to take risks, and in some 
cases, even do harm in the name of protecting or restoring peace or order. 
In doing so, they bestow a unique level of responsibility on the members of 
these professions to manage the harm done in the course of their professional 
duties. This dispensation is not afforded citizens at large. 
In the military professions, whose purpose it is to fight and win wars, 
members consciously accept the ultimate personal risk-death in battle-
along with the weighty responsibility of doing the ultimate harm-killing 
others-if necessary to achieve victory. Law enforcement officers may face 
death or injury in apprehending those who disrupt domestic peace by break-
ing the law, and they may use force, even lethal force under certain condi-
tions, in trying to make an arrest.3 Unlike soldiers, however, law enforcement 
officers are not typically permitted to risk harm to bystanders while carrying 
out their duties.4 
The obligation to prevent harm significantly affects law-enforcement 
operations. For example, when New York City police responded to a call 
regarding a disturbed person at a homeless shelter, the suspect confronted an 
officer with a knife, The officer tried to convince the man to drop the weapon, 
and while talking to him, inched closer to get into a position to disarm the 
man. Suddenly, the man lunged forward, stabbing the officer in the chest. The 
officer fatally shot the disturbed man before dying himself. 
This example, together with that of the platoon leader, illustrates the dif-
ference between military and law enforcement approaches to ethics in dan-
gerous situations. In both cases, neither the soldiers nor the police were in 
immediate danger, but both perceived differently the risks to themselves and 
the corresponding permissibility of risks to others. In common, however, are 
the respective decisions they made that affected to varying degrees the lives 
and well-being of others, making this integral part of their professional duties 
ethical decisions.s 
Ethics in Dangerous Situations 123 
To ensure that members act ethically in dangerous situations, their pro-
fessions must educate and inspire them in understanding their codes of eth-
ics and committing to upholding them. Doing the right thing in dangerous 
situations is more than simply following rules; it also requires sound judg-
ment in order to understand and balance the competing risks involved. Such 
judgment stems from character, which is best developed through institutions 
and programs created and maintained by the professions. Strong character is 
a tremendous tonic in the face of the chaotic danger that these professionals 
often face, and it fosters resiliency in the face of the tension that comes from 
balancing competing ethical demands. (See Chapter 9 for a discussion on 
character traits of leaders who earn trust.) An understanding of the character 
required for professional emergency responders, soldiers, and police begins 
with an understanding of the common ethical principles each of their profes-
sions shares. 
SmlNG THE TERMS 
The professional organizations that recruit, train, and deploy soldiers, police, 
and emergency responders, though their operating environments are often 
dramatically different, may all be called defenders, or in domestic situations, 
protectors of the peace because of the charters they are given by the insti-
tutions that empower them with these responsibilities. Since they willingly 
serve in these professions and accept their principles by virtue of oath and 
long-term membership, they are crisis professionals. 
Respect as the Common Foundation 
Concepts like necessary force, proportionality, human rights, and immunity 
from harm underpin the basic principles at play in moral arguments and sub-
sequent judgments about crisis professionals' actions in dangerous situations. 
These concepts inform the principle of respect for basic human rights and the 
humanity of others (including potential and actual adversaries) that is foun-
dational to the professional ethics of crisis professionals that guide them in 
their daily duties. Although the context of dangerous situations will vary, the 
common moral grounding for all of them is the basic respect for human rights 
that all of them engender. When crisis professionals are forced to make tough 
decisions about balancing risks, and those decisions result in harm, it is hoped 
that they can find strength in the power of these imperatives anchored in the 
moral worth of humanity. 
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Dangerous Situations Defined 
Dangerous situations are essentially those that involve threats to the peace 
that are tantamount to actual or potential violations of rights. Their degree 
defines their meaning and prompts a contemplation of force as a response. 
At the international level, external threats are commonly referred to as acts of 
aggression, whereby nations or entities threaten the collective rights of oth-
ers by actual or implied military force against an adversary's territory, people, 
or resources.6 Domestic or internal threats occur when the aggression is per-
sonal rather than collective, with a personal rights violation at the heart of the 
wrong.7 Here, the rights of individual persons are intentionally violated, often 
through personal coercion, for varying selfish motives, resulting in crime or 
the disruption of the common civic peace, which demands that police inter-
vene, apprehend the suspected criminals, and restore a state of safety. 
Though crimes might be isolated events, their frequent occurrence can 
create an uneasiness in a community that if left unaddressed could lead to 
reduced confidence in the rule of law and, over time, to increasing lawlessness. 
A central principle of law enforcement is that all citizens in a society bound by 
the rule of law are entitled to a peaceful existence, and most law enforcement 
departments' foundational codes begin with this basic premise. For example, 
the Los Angeles Police Department's (LAPD) vision statement begins with a 
commitment to serving the community while protecting the rights of all per-
sons, and fundamental to these rights is the basic right to live in peace.s 
Naturally occurring phenomena can also be dangerous and put citizens 
at risk. A natural disaster, like Hurricane Katrina in 2005, is an example of a 
situation where people's lives are in jeopardy, but without human aggressors. 
Other examples include traffic accidents or infrastructure fires, both poten-
tially but not always caused by humans but not necessarily from aggressive 
motives.9 Emergency responders, like firefighters and paramedics, restore 
peace by mitigating disruptive conditions through quick response and aid to 
those affected. 
Fighting wars is different from fighting crime, and fighting crime is dif-
ferent from saving lives. The military defends states; police and other first 
responders defend individuals. Despite such differences, the desired result is a 
shared intent to restore the rights of those affected, whether they are a collec-
tion of individual rights in a state or the basic rights of individuals to life and 
freedom that civic violence, crime, or accident threatens. The perspectives of 
those who are professionally bound to face danger are varied, but the ethics 
behind their professional obligations are linked by their common inspiration 
from basic human rights. 
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MORAL STATUS OF ADVERSARIES AND NON-ADVERSARIES 
Dangerous situations are most often made so by adversaries, who may be 
individuals or collections of individuals with motives to commit or threaten 
aggression. Crisis professionals are empowered to respond with deadly force, 
but the degree of response varies by their office, or alternatively, by the moral 
status of their respective adversaries. Comparing opposing soldiers in a war 
against criminals on the street yields some observations about the differences 
in moral status that exist between them. 
In combat, when soldiers ambush opposing soldiers and kill them, they 
are not commonly judged as murderers. The label perhaps does not fit since 
killing for the sake of their nation's cause-and accepting that they could ulti-
mately be killed while doing so-is what soldiers agree to do when they freely 
join the military. (From another perspective, one could argue that these soldiers 
knowingly surrender their rights to personal safety when they opt to become 
soldiers.) Change soldiers in the ambush example to police and opposing 
soldiers to suspected criminals, and one's intuition may not be so clear-cut. 
Ambushing and killing suspected lawbreakers seems harder to morally justify 
because somehow the tactic of ambushing does not seem to fit what police 
are supposed to do. Rather, it is beyond the scope of what society expects, and 
empowers, police to do. Ambushing is hunting with the goal of killing on sight, 
without questions. Soldiers expect to do this and to be targets of it in the course 
of their combat duties. It seems unlikely that police as well as the citizens they 
serve would share these expectations for law enforcement agents. 
Why are expectations for soldiers and police different? The answer 
involves rights. Prominent military ethicist Michael Walzer puts it this way: 
Soldiers, if they serve freely, and they fight for a just cause, consciously accept 
that their basic rights to personal safety are secondary to their duty to risk their 
lives in fighting their nation's battles. Governments tacitly affirm this through 
the convention of supplying their militaries with weapons and personnel, all 
of whom swear an oath of allegiance as part of their entry into service. This 
process legitimizes the killing soldiers do in the course of battle, making it 
state-sanctioned, justified killing rather than murder. 
Law enforcement officers on the other hand are not charged with fight-
ing their state's wars; their scope is much narrower. They are empowered by 
regional and local governments to keep the domestic peace and safeguard 
the citizenry. This is a morally important difference. While soldiers typically 
fight to establish or reestablish order on a large scale, law enforcers preserve 
order on a much smaller one. They operate under a civil code ingrained with 
the basic concepts of rights-based rule of law and are bound to honor it even 
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while apprehending those who are attempting to break it. This leads them to 
greatly restrain their lethality in order to maximize their chances of bringing 
suspected criminals to face justice, One can see these notions in the policies 
of law enforcement agencies, like the New York Police Department's (NYPD) 
imperative for its officers to use force to stop rather than kill, 
The Management Principles of the LAPD further illustrate this point 
by prescribing the appropriate mind-set for its officers in the course of their 
duties:" a peace officer's enforcement should not be done in grudging adher-
ence to the legal rights of the accused, but in a sincere spirit of seeking that 
every accused person is given all of his rights as far as it is within the pow-
ers of the police,"lo By urging its officers to be mindful of the principles that 
empower them, the LAPD seeks to maximize the preservation of the rights of 
those it also seeks to apprehend, as well as reinforce the ethics of its profession, 
CHALLENGES TO THE WAR-LAW ENFORCEMENT PARADIGM 
Terrorism and insurgency pose difficult challenges for crisis professionals 
because the tactics used by terrorists and insurgents often blur the distinction 
between criminals and enemy combatants. For military professionals, coun-
terinsurgency doctrine overlays traditional combat tactics. For example, a unit 
might assume nontraditional tasks, like agricultural crop management and 
construction, while continuing to fight pitched battles against hostiles whose 
actions classify them as classic combatants one day but common criminals 
the next, 
Law enforcement agents face similar challenges as terrorism and insur-
gency change the scope of their operations, often dramatically. On city 
streets, police increasingly find themselves "out-gunned" by drug traffickers 
and gangs. Overseas deployments are now a possibility for law enforcers, as 
national governments tap them to train foreign police agencies, often from 
scratch. In extreme cases, in regions like East Timor, where there is no com-
monly accepted rule of law, police trainers must assume full policing duties 
until a law enforcement system can be established, from the ground up. More 
and more, these types of situations are becoming the norm with soldiers polic-
ing and police officers soldieringY Any ethical approach that seeks common 
ground for all types of crisis professionals must consider the ways in which 
their lines of duty continue to blur and blend. 
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COMMITTING HARM, DISCRIMINATION IN USE OF FORCE 
AND TARGETS, NECESSITY, AND PROPORTIONALITY 
A5 noted earlier, soldiers killing other soldiers in war or police killing sus-
pected lawbreakers in self-defense or defense of others is not considered mur-
der. Though societies might later view such deaths as unfortunate, it is unlikely 
that minds will change about the moral justification if it is affirmed that the 
soldiers and police were acting in accordance with their duties. What grounds 
thinking, or moral intuition, here is the notion that in dangerous situations 
those who can defend against a threat should do so, even if it results in some-
one's death or injury, and it would be wrong if they did not actY 
Justified defense of self or others has limits, however. Both soldiers and 
police are obligated to discriminate in their use of force, selection of targets, 
and means of applying force. Just as soldiers may not intentionally kill or 
harm noncombatants, police must avoid incidental harm to bystanders and 
make every effort to warn suspects before they use deadly force against them. 
International laws as well as internal military regulations prohibit certain 
weapons and restrict the excessive use of force in conflicts just as domestic law 
and internal police policies prescribe limits on the use of force. 
The crisis professionals' need to show restraint leads to a pronounced 
sense of tension when faced with the competing demand to accomplish 
whatever mission is required. Resolving this tension is the central ethical 
problem in dangerous situations. Perhaps the most common approach to this 
tension-and one that poses serious challenges to any principle-based pro-
fessional ethic-is that of classic ends-means, or utilitarian, reasoning. Simply 
put, this line of thinking holds that the best decision is the one that results in 
the most good and the least bad for the most people. For those empowered 
to respond in times of crisis, the most good comes from accomplishing their 
profession's mission, even if it means in extreme cases committing some harm 
in order to do so, which in tum flies in the face of professional duties to mini-
mize risk to themselves and others. The greater the perceived" good" or worth 
of the outcome, the lesser the value of the individual rights of persons affected 
by the crisis, and the stronger the pressure to violate them in order to secure 
the best outcome. 
A natural offshoot of this reasoning is the concept of necessity and its 
cousin military necessity. Necessity is a powerful aspect of ends-means rea-
soning, and crisis professionals need to consider its entire scope and to what 
it commits them as they make decisions in dangerous situations. It follows 
from this line of thinking that the more good one thinks can be achieved, the 
more harm one should be willing to cause or accept in order to do it. Taken to 
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extremes, this reasoning can lead to troubling actions by leaders under pres-
sure to produce good outcomesY A contemporary instance of this is illus-
trated in Lieutenant William Calley's closing remarks at his court-martial, 
where he was found guilty of orchestrating and participating in the murder 
of more than five hundred unarmed civilians in the village of My Lai in 1968 
during the Vietnam War: 
If I have committed a crime, the only crime that I have committed is in 
judgment of my values. Apparently, I valued my troop's lives more than 
I did that of the enemy. When my troops were getting massacred and 
mauled by an enemy I couldn't see, I couldn't feel, and I couldn't touch, 
that nobody in the military system ever described as anything other than 
communism-they didn't give it a race, they didn't give it a sex, they didn't 
give it an age, they never let me believe it was just a philosophy in a man's 
mind and that was my enemy out there, and when it became between me 
and that enemy, I had to value the lives of my troops, and I feel that is the 
only crime I have committed.14 
Calley's assertion that his troops'lives were worth more than his enemys' 
is clearly an attempted value-based justification for the murders in the village; 
coupled with his claim about the difficulty of identifying the enemy, his ratio-
nale for the slaughter becomes more apparent. Though killing a large num-
ber of people who appeared to be innocent was a near-term bad, there was 
a chance they could actually be or tum out to be the enemy, so killing them 
was in fact a larger good because it would prevent them from killing his sol-
diers. The duty for Calley to discriminate between friend or foe had less overall 
worth to him than the need to protect his soldiers. His actions reflect profes-
sional as well as ethical failures; he felt no tension because he perceived no 
boundaries to his judgment. As his example proves, such unrestrained reason-
ing in crisis can be extremely dangerous. 
Central to the constraints inherent in the ethical codes of crisis response 
professions is the concept of proportionality, which translates in ends-means 
reasoning that prohibits actions whose outcomes result in more harm than 
goOd.15 Thus, permissible actions are those in which the good achieved is pro-
portional to or in balance with the bad incurred.16 For example, professional 
military organizations must ensure their weapons are appropriate to the target 
type and avoid "squashing a squirrel with a tank,"17 because doing so clearly 
overvalues destruction and undervalues the good produced by it. From a long-
term perspective, protracted" squashing" or excessive use of force will threaten 
any claims of intentions to fight a just war, given that a primary objective of a 
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just war is the establishment of a better state of peace. The wanton pulveriza-
tion of an adversary seems hardly likely to produce such a goal. 
Proportionality is also a critical component of law enforcement's profes-
sional ethic, as evident in the tenets of the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, 
an oath that every new law enforcement officer recites during graduation cer-
emonies or signs when joining a police department. ls This oath, like all pro-
fessional oaths, is thought to be morally binding throughout one's career of 
service. The Law Enforcement Code of Ethics is particularly insightful in its 
acknowledgment of the powerful emotions and tensions officers experience 
in dangerous situations as they make decisions about risk and the use of 
deadly force. Just as philosophers and religious thinkers have railed through-
out the ages against rage, bloodlust, and "revengeful cruelty as unjust inspira-
tions for battle,"19 the law enforcement code likewise implores its officers to 
restrain their personal feelings and prevent them from influencing their deci-
sions about risk and deadly force amid their pursuit of criminals. They must 
enforce the law "courageously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice, 
or ill will, [and] never employ unnecessary force or violence"in the process.20 
Unnecessary force is understood here as force disproportionate to the 
harm potentially being done. Such a use of force would be unprofessional and 
unethical because it would violate the rights of those against whom the force 
is directed. Even though a person or persons may be actively disrupting the 
civic peace, they do not lose the right to be treated humanely as they are being 
apprehended. Common ground on this point seems clear for both law enforc-
ers and military professionals; force without constraint and discrimination is 
unprofessional, unethical, and in the broadest sense, greatly undermines their 
most common collective goal: a stable peace at any leveFI 
Proportionality properly considered at each level guides necessity in each 
context; often, what's necessary for police in terms of violence is differ-
ent from what's necessary for the military. The following example illustrates 
this point: During the 1992 Los Angeles riots, a joint Marine-police patrol 
responded to a domestic disturbance. The police readied to enter the room and 
yelled to the Marines to provide them cover. The Marines responded by firing 
approximately two hundred rounds through the door, the minimum volume 
of fire necessary in their professional world to "suppress" a target and provide 
cover for others moving forward in an assault. Fortunately for all, no one was 
injured.22 Though military and law enforcement organizations instruct their 
members to use the least force necessary, this example shows they have very 
different conceptions of what this means. In the policemen's view here," cover" 
probably meant aiming weapons at the door, and yelling"come out or we'll 
130 Enhancing One 's Psychological Body Armor 
shoot!" in order to gain time to understand the situation and consider whether 
nonviolent means could resolve the situation. As far as the Marines were con-
cerned, however, "cover"meant suppressing the target even at the risk of oth-
ers in the area. 
These different reactions result in part from the way each profession per-
ceives threats and trains to deal with them. For police, the threat is a law-
breaker who requires apprehension but still has a full complement of basic 
rights. Police emotions might run high, especially if the lawbreaker's offense is 
a horrible one, but their professional code demands apprehension and deliv-
ery to justice first, and deadly force only as a last resort. Members of the mili-
tary on the other hand are professionally bound to defeat enemies. The focus 
of their training, resourced by their states, envisions the most extreme sce-
narios, in which all dimensions of military force (land power, sea power, air 
power) are brought to bear to completely destroy an enemy or cause it to sur-
render in order to restore peace. Thus, military professionals' first consider-
ation is and must be the most force permissible.23 This distinction means that 
any set of principles of necessity and proportionality meant to address all crisis 
professionals must be mindful of the rights that their professions are charged 
to respect and protect. 
IMMUNITY FROM HARM AND THE ETHICS OF RISK 
While the principles of necessity and proportionality restrain the use of force, 
they provide no guidance on how crisis professionals should aim or direct 
force. There are no restrictions on whom one mayor may not target with force; 
rather, it is only important that the act be required to achieve success. In the 
absence of boundaries, these principles clash head-on with the notion of uni-
versal human rights, and for crisis professionals, represent clear contradictions 
to the codes they are sworn to follow. 
A victory-at-all-costs mentality in a military context, for example, presents 
a clear challenge to the principles of human rights that most nations subscribe 
to . either through their constitutions or through membership in the United 
Nations, whose charter clearly articulates human rights principles. In terms of 
killing, then, if all persons have a basic right to life, killing them would appear 
to be wrong or unjust unless they have done something to forfeit that right. 
As Walzer and others have pointed out, when conflicts occur, merely living 
near or within a group of aggressors does not automatically constitute a for-
feiture of rights.24 In a similar vein, just because one happens to be in the same 
building as a criminal, it does not mean he or she ought to be subjected to the 
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same loss of rights that the criminal faces in the course of his apprehension. 
One could object to this by posing this question: When faced with a choice 
between defending myself and my colleagues or the members of a hostile 
population who also have rights, whom should I protect? Put another way, 
is it ever permissible to violate or even abandon the rights of others when the 
rights of your own people are also in jeopardy? These are fair questions. 
Placing restrictions on the use of force can put friendly and innocent lives 
at risk as well as impede mission accomplishment. Thus, if such restraints exist, 
there need to be compelling reasons for them. Answers to the above questions 
begin by noting that while the ethics of dangerous situations center on bal-
ancing risks, the balancing process rests upon the fundamental and universal 
principle that all persons deserve to live their lives freely, not under threat of 
violence or oppression by others.25 Because individuals have these rights, they 
are considered immune from harm and remain so unless they do something 
to warrant a loss of immunity. In the context of dangerous situations, this typi-
cally happens when persons threaten to harm or otherwise violate the univer-
sal rights of others. 
Immunity protects non-harming persons from being intentionally tar-
geted by lethal force during crisis response operations. If it can be thought of 
as morally enabling war fighting and policing, then it stands to reason that 
these same rights must also be preserved during the course of those activ-
ities, otherwise responders would undermine the moral purpose of taking 
action in the first place. In the United States, crisis professions draw inspira-
tion and affirm allegiance to the Constitution, which codifies the universal-
ity of these rights and demands their defense. The UN Charter also serves the 
same function. 
It follows then that to establish the principle of immunity, which states 
generally that a crisis professional when considering the use of lethal force must 
attempt to discriminate between legitimate and illegitimate targets as well as 
minimize the spillover of the effects of force on those not involved in the situa-
tion, law-enforcement professionals engaging criminals must avoid such spill-
over entirely because of their obligation to protect civilians from harm.26 
Although the immunity principle obligates regular soldiers and police to 
refrain from directly targeting noncombatants or bystanders, what role, if any, 
does it play in today's complex "irregular" conflicts? Fights that pit combatants 
against combatants within clearly defined battle lines occur rarely in the con-
text of the kinds of irregular wars U.S. forces find themselves in, thus intro-
ducing higher probabilities of noncombatant casualties. Moreover, as noted 
above, the roles of crisis professionals are increasingly becoming blended or 
blurred as some adversaries seek cover within noncombatant environments. 
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In these as well as domestic policing situations, crisis responders often find 
that their best and often only way to stop a violent act is by placing bystand-
ers at risk, directly or indirectly, Imagine, for example, a police sniper tracking 
a person who is threatening to kill someone he is holding hostage, The officer 
sees him through a window of the building, but knows there are other people 
inside. A shot, if it ricochets, could injure or kill others, but it is the only way to 
stop the man from murdering his hostage. Does the sniper have an obligation 
to minimize or even avoid those casualties? If the commitment to the right to 
life is a serious one, the answer would appear to be yes. It is a truism about 
rights that if someone has a right, others should generally avoid violating it 
unless there is a compelling overriding reason. Dangerous situations do not 
override immunity so much as they recognize that because some situations 
make it impossible to avoid noncombatant casualties, it is similarly impossible 
to hold crisis professionals generally morally responsible for causing casual-
ties if they do their reasonable best to avoid them. The best that can be done is 
to prescribe general limits, like proportionality and immunity, and hold these 
professionals responsible for complying with their oaths and charters. 
MANAGING RISK 
The more complex a dangerous environment is, the more difficult ethical deci-
sion making becomes. For crisis professionals to succeed in their missions in 
such environments, they must find and engage the enemy or criminal element 
discriminately within the population. To do so, they must delve into the popu-
lation and find their targets, increasing their own vulnerability to attack as well 
as the probability of casualties, which would not only affect their units, but 
also potentially the overall popular will to carry on the fight. 27 
An alternative option to exacerbating vulnerabilities is to opt for weapons 
of greater standoff range, but these often decrease the ability to discriminate 
combatants from noncombatants. Adversaries who show no regard for the 
principle of immunity, and who kill wantonly, raise the pressure on principled 
leaders. Perhaps the truest test of leadership during crisis is for those in charge 
to inspire their subordinates to place themselves at great risk to preserve the 
rights and lives of innocents when their adversaries lack compunction about 
killing or harming in other ways.Yet, the subordinates must act, because doing 
so is part of the fiber of their professional lives. Moreover, because they receive 
training, equipment, and other resources to reduce their risk when fighting, it 
follows that they must accept some additional risk if it means preserving the 
lives of noncombatants, who by definition do not have these resources.28 
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Michael Ignatieffs Virtual War, about NATO's air campaign in its 1999 
intervention in Kosovo, offers a good example of the extent of risk that cri-
sis professionals are sometimes obliged to take. Describing this campaign as 
one with "high moral language of the cause" but "limited character," Ignatieff 
criticizes NATO's tactic of bombing from high altitudes to eliminate the risk 
of successful surface-to-air missile (SAM) attacks by Serbians.29 By flying so 
high, the pilots could not clearly identify friend from foe as they searched for 
targets below. They made several widely publicized target identification errors 
that resulted in noncombatant casualties.30 
Ignatieffs problem with this kind of "warfare of minimum risk" is that it 
willfully avoids personal combat risk while increasing the risk to innocents. He 
considers it patently immoral and unethical.31 What makes this willingness to 
kill, but not risk dying unethical is that by transferring all the risk of combat to 
noncombatants, pilots-as well as their leaders who established their rules of 
engagement-completely void their moral responsibility to take due care in 
discriminating between combatants and noncombatants.32 
As noted previously, rescue workers may take only limited risks when per-
forming their duties, but this does not mean that they have no obligation to 
manage that risk. For them, managing risk is manifest in the investment in 
training and equipment for them so they are as well prepared as possible to 
conduct rescue operations as safely as possible. A parent is wrong to rush into 
a building to save his or her child in the presence of firefighters. It is right for 
the firefighters to do it because of their training and equipment, which greatly 
minimizes harm to them as well as to others. This does not suggest that rescue 
workers must eliminate the possibility of harm in dangerous situations; rather, 
they must eliminate the necessity of harm. Just as police may only undertake 
certain courses of action, like a high-speed chase, when harming bystanders is 
not a certain outcome, rescue workers may only attempt a rescue if they know 
that its success will not require harm to themselves or others not already at risk. 
The requirement to eliminate the necessity of harm in large part distin-
guishes rescue workers from soldiers and police. Mission accomplishment 
usually entails soldiers and police employing force to defeat human adversar-
ies who are also using force (and thus making the situation dangerous). The 
role of rescue workers, on the other hand, is to reduce the danger for everyone 
affected. Thus they do not accept the same risk experienced by the people they 
intend to rescue. For this reason, risk management for them entails reducing 
the overall harm possible rather than shifting the harm to the adversary. 
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FINDING COMMON GROUND 
Though crisis professions vary in many ways, from the context of situations 
faced to the nature of adversaries, the generalized formulations below illus-
trate common ground between them with an eye toward the formulation of a 
unified crisis professional ethic: 
• Necessity: Use lethal force and create risk for others and yourself only 
when there is no other way to accomplish your mission and restore peace 
or domestic order, 
Proportionality: Use as much force as is required to accomplish your pro-
fessional mission but also preserve the rights of those affected by your 
mission. Accept a degree of risk to yourself and others that is commensu-
rate with your professional obligations. 
• Immunity: Those persons not directly engaged in threatening you, your 
colleagues, and others not involved in the situation in any meaningful 
way have the right to not be intentionally harmed as a result of your direct 
or indirect actions. 
• Discrimination: When considering the use of deadly force, make every rea-
sonable effort to distinguish those who threaten from those who do not, 
even if doing so means you and those who follow you must put your-
selves at risk. 
Respect: Honor the basic human rights of all those affected by your profes-
sional mission and always consider them when making decisions in crisis 
situations. 
CONCLUSION 
Revisiting the introductory discussion of the decision made by the platoon 
leader, some judgments can be made from the perspective of the ethics of 
dangerous situations and some thoughts offered by way of judgment. First 
consider the professional identity of the platoon leader. It is clearly one of a 
crisis professional, commissioned by oath to his nation to lead soldiers to fight 
its battles. His oath commits him to assume risk to himself and his soldiers 
in the course of their duties, which include taking reasonable steps to distin-
guish friend from foe in battle. By forgoing his unit's SOp, one could argue that 
he fails to take those steps largely out of concern of putting his soldiers at risk 
of sniper attack. Yet, this failure somehow seems to discount the lieutenant's 
credibility in judging threats to his soldiers, which clearly matters in this case; 
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after all, he was there, so who better to decide what dangers really existed? 
Another objection, to the lieutenant's decision to open fire on the sedan, 
might be linked to the nature of the platoon's mission, arguing that it more 
closely resembles a law enforcement operation than a military mission, and 
therefore requires decision making about force and risk similar to those police 
officers make. (See Chapter 6 for a discussion on personal responsibility.) 
One might then conclude that judgment might be better served by a con-
sideration of this lieutenant's character. Is he honest? Does he truly embrace, 
through his words and demonstrated actions, the values of his profession? 
Does he truly care for his soldiers? Answers to these questions offer insight 
into what kind of person he is, which in turn could reveal something about 
his motivations for his decision to fire on the sedan and ultimately reveal the 
overall moral quality of his decisions. 
From this admittedly brief analysis, the difficulty of ethical decision mak-
ing for crisis professionals is apparent. These responders are required to win 
wars or keep the peace, protect the people they work with, and make every 
effort to protect those involved in the situations they respond to. This is dif-
ficult enough in clear-cut situations, where danger manifests itself in obvi-
ous ways, but the emergence of asymmetric enemy and criminal adversaries 
increases the complexity of these environments and inevitably raises pres-
sure to make good decisions about harm and risk. Certain qualities unify cri-
sis professionals across the spectrum of dangers that they face. Courage and 
resiliency will continue to underscore their collective character as they stand 
against the myriad of threats that exist to all levels of peace in society. 
KEY TAKE-AWAY POINTS 
1. Professions are organizations or groups whose members freely choose to 
serve through swearing or affirming acceptance to their codes of conduct 
or duties. In crisis professions, members' duties involve facing risk, often 
to extreme degrees, to protect others from danger or harm. 
2. Though crisis professions vary by type and scope of duties, their individ-
ual codes of ethical conduct share certain general principles. The most 
fundamental of these principles is a respect for humanity and the basic 
rights to life and freedom. 
3. Judgments about the ethical conduct of crisis professionals in complex 
and dangerous situations may rely on such principles as discrimination 
and proportionality, depending on the complexity of the situation, but in 
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the end they may come down to judgments about basic virtues like char-
acter and integrity, 
KEY REFERENCES 
Grant, J. Kevin. "Ethics and Law Enforcement." FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 
2002, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m2194/is_12_71/ai_96453523/pg...2/?tag= 
content;col1. 
Walzer, Michael. Just and Unjust Wars. 2nd ed. New York: Basic Books, 1992. 
NOTES 
Special thanks to Captain Eamon Deery, Lieutenant Louis Caserma, Lieutenant 
Daniel Modell, Detective Darrell Corti, and Officer Joseph Agosto of the New York 
City Police Department for their efforts in this project. 
1. Peter Kilner, Nate Allen, and Nate Self, eds., A Platoon Leader's Tour (New York: West 
Point Center for the Advancement of Leader Development and Organizational 
Learning. 2009), 66-67. 
2. Ibid" 68. 
3. New York City Police Department policy states, "Police officers shall not discharge 
their firearms to subdue a fleeing felon who presents no threat of imminent death 
or serious physical injury to themselves or another person present." Manual of Use of 
Deadly Physical Force, section 203-12. 
4. The authors owe this point to Dr. Michael Matthews. 
5. Louis P Pojman, Ethics: Discauering Right and Wrong (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth 
Publishing. 1995), 1-3. 
6. Brian Orend, The Morality of War (petersborough, Ontario: Broadview Press, 2006), 
3; and Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 2nd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 
51. 
7. See Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 58-59. 
8. LAPD, "Motto, Mission Statement, and Core Values," http://www.lapdonline.org/ 
search_results/ contenCbasic view/842. 
9. Aggressively motivated humans are those who intentionally seek to inflict harm 
on others or others' possessions. In the domestic sense, these are obviously crimi-
nals with motives like armed robbery, murder, arson, and so on, Accidental harm in 
the domestic sense would include instances where systems or conveyances fail for 
non-intentional reasons, like when an electrical appliance shorts and causes a fire or 
brakes fail on a car and cause a collision. 
10. LAPD, "Management Principles of the LAPD," http://www.lapdonline.org/inside_ 
the_lapd/content_basic view/846. 
11. Contracted security forces complicate this idea further because they are not bound 
to any kind of professional ethic in the same way crisis professionals are. Rather, 
Ethics in Dangerous Situations 137 
they are obligated to provide services only to the extent their contract identifies. With 
respect to risk, this causes them to differ from crisis professionals in morally signifi-
cant ways. 
12. Police may be liable legally as well as morally if they fail to make an arrest. For exam-
ple, an officer who ignores a drunk driver may be held responsible for any harm later 
committed by the driver. The authors owe this point to Dr. Michael Matthews. 
13. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 130-132. 
14. "Remember My Lai," PBS Frontline, transcript of original broadcast, May 23, 1989, 
http://www. pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/programs/transcripts/714.htrnl. 
15. For an explanation of differing views of utility, see William Shaw, "The 
Consequentialist Perspective," in Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory, ed. James 
Dreier (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 10. 
16. Proportionality is a notoriously difficult requirement to calculate, as one must mea-
sure harms that are not always commensurate as well as calculate the future harms 
one is trying to avoid. 
17. arend, The Morality of War, 119. 
18. KevinJ. Grant, "Ethics and Law Enforcement," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, December 
2002,2, http://findarticles.com/p/ articles/mi_m2194/is_12_71/ai_96453523/pg...2I?tag 
=content;col1. 
19. See arend, The Morality of War, 9-12. 
20. Law Enforcement Code of Ethics, University of North Carolina Department of 
Public Safety, http://www.dps.unc.eduIDPS%20Policies%20&%20Procedures/Appe 
ndix/3LawEnforcementCodeofEthics. pdf. 
21. The NYPD employs a concept known as the "scale of escalating force, force contin-
uum" to manage the proportionality of force . This continuum identifies several lev-
els of force, the lowest being an officer's mere presence and the highest being deadly 
physical force. The levels of force are based on the situation and can change as cir-
cumstances change. Officers are not required to start the application of force at the 
lowest level and exhaust all alternatives before progressing to the next level; where 
they start depends on the level of force a suspect employs. Officers in all instances 
are required to use the minimum amount of force, consistent with their personal 
safety, to accomplish the mission at hand. NYPD officers will often say based on this 
that the suspect determines what kind of force the officer will use; the officer merely 
reacts and responds. 
22. James D. Delk, Fires and Furies: The LA Riots (Palm Springs, Calif.: ETC Publications, 
1995), quoted in Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Lessons in Command and Control 
from the Los Angeles Riots," Parameters 27 (1997): 88-109. 
23. Tony Pfaff, "Military Ethics in Complex Contingencies," in The Future of the Army 
Profession, ed. Don M. Snider and Lloyd J. Matthews, 2nd ed. (New York: McGraw 
Hill, 2005), 412-414. 
24. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 146. 
25. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 53-54; also see Paul Christopher, The Ethics of War and 
Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues, 2nd ed. (frenton, N.J. : Prentice Hall, 
1999),164-166. 
138 Enhancing One's Psycholog ical Body Armor 
26. Paolo Tripolcli, "Peacekeepers, Moral Autonomy, and the Use of Force," Journal of 
Military Ethics 5, no. 3 (2006): 217. 
27. Martin Shaw, The Western Way of War (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), 35. 
28. James M. Dubik, "Human Rights, Command Responsibility, and Walzer's Just War 
Theory,"Phiiosophy and Public Affairs 11, no. 4 (1982): 355. 
29. Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (Toronto: Viking Inc., 2000), 110. 
30. Their targeting mistakes included strikes on a refugee convoy, the home of an elderly 
Serb couple, a civilian train crossing a bridge, and the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. 
See Ignatieff, Virtual War, 103, 107. 
31, Ignatieff, Virtual War, 110. 
32. For a more complete discussion of obligations of combatants to take risks, see Don 
M. Snider, John A. Nag!, and Tony Pfaff, Anny Professionalism, Military Ethics, and 
Officership in the 21st Century (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Army War College Strategic 
Stuclies Institute, 1999). 
